Capital Dynamics in the North Sea Herring Fishery by Bjorndal, Trond & Conrad, Jon M.
Marine Resource Economics. Vol. 4. pp. 63-74. 1987 0738-1360/87 13.00 + .00
Printed in the UK. All rights reserved. Copyright C 1^7 Taylor & Francis
Capital Dynamics in the
North Sea Herring Fishery
TROND BJ0RNDAL
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
Institute of Fisheries Economics




Department of Agricultural Economics
Ithaca, New York
Abstract Dynamic adjustment is an integral part of natural resource econom-
ics. Commonly, capital is assumed to respond instantaneously to changes in
profits, white in reality adjustment may take place only with a time lag. In this
paper, an empirical analysis of capital (boat) dynamics in the North Sea her-
ring fishery is undertaken. A discrete time model is formulated to model de-
cisions of boats to enter or exit the fishery. A lagged model is specified to
reflect adjustment time to changes in profits. The empirical results indicate
that fleet adjustment in this fishery primarily depends on current period profits
and that the opportunity cost may depend on returns in the alternative fishery.
Inclusion of lagged variables to account for the construction time for new
boats, showed only a small improvement in the statistical fit. Moreover, the
results did not support a hypothesis that entry in response to positive profits
is more elastic than e.xit due to negative profits.
Introduction
Dynamic adjustment is an integral part of natural resource economics. Most eco-
nomic models are formulated in continuous time as a system of differential equa-
tions. Both natural and man-made capital is commonly assumed to respond in-
stantaneously to changes in, e.g., harvesting and profitability conditions. An
example of this type of model is given by the Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model
(Clark 1976). In real iife, these assumptions are not likely to hold. Once a piece
of capital is committed to a fishery, the owner may be reluctant to transfer to
another fishery in the short run due to non-negligible transfer costs. Accordingly,
adjustment to changes in profitability conditions may take place only with a time
lag. For renewable resources, natural growth may occur at discrete time intervals
(seasonal growth), while recruitment commonly takes place with a time lag.
Hence, for both types of capital stocks one is led to consider discrete time models,
possibly with a lag structure, so that a difference equation model is called for
rather than a differentia! equation model.
The purpose of this paper is to undertake an empirical analysis of capital (boat)
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dynamics in the North Sea herring fishery, based on data for the 1963-77 period.
A discrete time model will be formulated to model decisions of boats to enter or
exit the fishery. Secondly, a lagged model will be specified to reflect adjustment
time to changes in profitability conditions. Although a number of papers analyze
models of population dynamics by means of delay-difference equations (Clark
1976a: Deriso 1980; Bj0rndal 1985). the empirical literature on capital (boat) dy-
namics is more scant.
The present analysis poses a number of econometric problems. The instan-
taneous adjustment models commonly assumed in theoretical analyses, specifying
perfect mobility of capital, are hardly appropriate for the type of fishery we are
dealing with. However, specifying the "correct" model is nontrivial and misspe-
cification bias can be a potential problem. Secondly, estimating such models re-
quires price, cost, and effort data, which in many instances may not be available.
In the following section, we shall give a brief description of the North Sea
herring fishery. Alternative models of capital dynamics will be specified and es-
timated. The paper concludes with some recommendations for estimating equa-
tions for capital dynamics in resource models.
The North Sea Herring Fishery
The North Sea herring fishery takes place in the central and northern North Sea,
with the main season in the months May to September. In the present case study,
data for the Norwegian purse seine fleet will be used. The fishery, utilizing this
technology, started in 1963. In the middle ofthe 1970s, however, the stock was
severely depleted under an open access regime and the fishery was closed at the
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end of 1977. Regulations have been in effect ever since so as to allow the stock
to recover. Table 1 contains estimates of stock size, Norwegian harvest and Nor-
wegian purse seiners in the fishery for the period 1963-77.
An important characteristic of North Sea herring, as of other clupeids, is their
schooling behavior. Schooling takes place to reduce the effectiveness of predators
(Partridge 1982). Moreover, schooling fish contract their feeding and spawning
range as the stock is reduced, with the sizeof schools often remaining unchanged.
This behavior has permitted the development of very effective means of har-
vesting, especially the purse seine. With modern fish-flnding equipment, har-
vesting can be profitable even at low stock levels. For these reasons, changes in
stock size may have little effect on harvest quantity. In the extreme, constant
effort may produce a constant harvest regardless of stock size {Murphy 1977;
Ulltang 1980; Clark 1982). Hence, open access may cause severe stock depletion
as evidenced by the collapse of a number of fisheries based on the harvest of
schooling species (Bj0rndal and Conrad 1987).
Figure 1, which is a state-space diagram showing combinations of fleet par-
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Figure 1. Stock Size and Norwegian Fleet Participation in the North Sea Herring Fishery.^ Trond Bjprndal and Jon M. Conrad
the dynamics ofthe fishery. The early years ofthis fishery (1963-68) were char-
acterized by increasing fleet participation and decreasing stock size. Since the
stock initially was at a fairly high level, this period may represent "mining" of
the resource. However, the situation changed in 1968. with generally decreasing
fleet participation and stock size in the ensuing years. Presumably the declining
stock caused a decrease in profits, which led some boats to exit from the industry.
Nevertheless, profits were sufficient for the remaining boats.
Wilen (1976) analyzed common property exploitation of North Pacific fur seal.
This industry went through a dynamic process similar in part to the one illustrated
in Figure 1. However, exit from the industry allowed the stock to recover, and
the data illustrated that a stable bionomic equilibrium was being approached. For
North Sea herring, on the other hand, exit from the industry in the post-1968
period did not reduce harvest sufficiently to allow the stock to recover.
Cost and price figures for the 1963-77 period are given in Table 2. Operating
costs per boat day (c,) include variable costs, mainly fuel. Fixed and opportunity
costs per boat per season (ft) include interest payments, depreciation, mainte-
nance, insurance, and an estimate of opportunity costs. Both cost figures rose
substantially in the 1970s. Despite nominal cost increases, however, the price-
cost ratio (p,/c,) was generally Increasing from 1972. Growing stock scarcity with
corresponding reductions in harvest (cf. Table 1) caused increases in price that
exceeded cost increases. An increase in the real price of herring will, veteris
Table 2





































































" Ail figures are in nominal Norwegian kroner (NOK). In the regressions, price figures
will have to be adjusted by a factor of 0.6, which represents the boat owner's share of
income. Cost figures only cover costs incurred by the boat owner.
Sources: p,: The Directorate of Fisheries, Norway
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paribus, improve profitability and attract new vessels or slow exit. As noted
above, the declining stock level worked in the opposite direction by decreasing
profitability and thus causing exit from the fishery. On balance, however, the net
effect was for exit from the industry after 1968.
We will assume an industry production function
H, - H(Et, S,, K.) (1)
where H, is harvest in year t, E, is fishing "effort" measured as the number of
boat days, S, is slock sii^e at the beginning of year t, while K, is the number of
boats participating in the fishery. The reason for including the latter variable in
the production function is the presence of external economies associated with the
number of boats in the fishery (Bj0rndal 1987).
We proceed to define industry profit (net revenues) in year t as
nt = PtH(-) - c,E, - f.K, (2)
where pt, c,, and f, are the per unit price of output, effort cost per boat day. and
fixed cost per vessel, respectively. Once a boat is committed to the fishery, a
certain fixed cost (f,) is incurred. In the long run, boat owners will need to cover
all costs. In the short run. fixed costs are irrelevant, and only variable costs are
relevant. There is, however, some ambiguity with respect to the relevance of
short run quasi-fixed costs such as set-up and transfer costs. This would call for
alternative cost specifications in the empirical work to be undertaken below. The
amount of variable costs (c,Ei) will depend on the intensity of fleet participation
(Et). Prices may vary overtime, but are assumed constant in a given season (year).
Moreover, it is implicitly assumed that all boats are identical.
In the standard fisheries model, it is postulated that the existence of aggregate
profits will entice entry to the fishery (Gordon 1954; Scott 1955; Smith 1%8):
K = nn (3)
Here, n is an adjustment parameter, indicating how quickly entry (exit) responds
to the existence of positive (negative) profits. In the discrete time model, the
adjustment equation becomes
K,^, - K, - nnt (4)
With n positive it will be the case that (a) K, +, > K, if n, > 0, (b) K,^ i < K, if
n, < O,and(c)Ki + i = K, ifl!, = 0. In this formulation, a simple linear adjustment
function is assumed. Other alternatives will be considered below.
It is possible that the rates of entry and exit may differ, so that n^ will apply
in case of entry to the fishery, i.e.. Xli > 0, and n" will apply in case of exit from
the fishery, i.e., n, < 0. In general, one would expect n^ 5= n", i.e., entry in
response to positive profits is more elastic than exit due to negative profits (Clark.
Clarke and Munro 1979). This will be tested for below by specifying and estimating
an asymetric adjustment function.
For the North Sea herring fishery, we have used number of participating boats
as our measure of capital. All purse seiners in the fishery employ the same har-68 Trond Bj0rndal and Jon M. Conrad
vesting techniques and the same equipment for electronic search such as echo-
sounder and sonar. Although a capital deepening has taken place over the data
period, the technology for search and catch has remained unchanged.
Vessel dynamics are assumed to occur according to
K, - K, = n (5)
i.e., entry or exit will depend on normalized (real) profits per boat. The unit of
n is vessels per Norwegian krone (NOK). For the empirical analysis, we use the
net revenue function to rewrite Equation 5 as follows:
HI E, K,
PI P.






































Model I represents our basic hypothesis about fleet adjustment. However, as
noted above, boat owners may in a given season consider fixed costs as "sunk."
This is taken into consideration in the other model specifications. In Model II,
the fixed cost is set equal to zero, while Model III assumes a constant f, over
time. Model IV assumes that fixed costs are sunk but that the vessel has an
opportunity cost approximated by the price of mackerel, where pM.i/pt is the
relative price of mackerel to herring. This variable has been specified, since fishing
mackerel for parts of the season may be considered an alternative to herring. A
priori one would expect fleet participation in the herring fishery to decline when
the real price of mackerel increases, i.e., the expected sign of n^ is negative.
For the empirical analysis, we have used the data set as reported in Tables 1
and 2. Time periods correspond to seasons (years). Error terms have been ap-
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sion lines have been estimated without an intercept term, which corresponds to
the theoretical models.
The results in Table 3 show that the explanatory power of the alternative
models varies. However, taking the fairly small sample size into account, regres-
sions I, III, and IV provide reasonably good fits ofthe underlying functions mea-
sured in terms of r^ In addition, in these three models all point estimates of n
are highly significant and lie in the range 0.09-0.12. Moreover, the point estimates
are not significantly different from 0.1, which indicates a fair degree of stability
for this parameter. The only exception is provided by Regression II, where the
point estimate of n happens to have the highest standard error.
It is noteworthy that Models I, III, and IV provide better fits than Model II
measured in terms of r^ and t-statistics. It will be recalled that while fixed and
opportunity costs were set equal to zero in Model II, some measure of these costs
was included in the other model specification. The results indicate that fixed and
opportunity costs influence the decisions of boat owners whether they should
participate in the herring fishery.
On a priori grounds. Mode! IV might appear to be a better specification than
Model III. Although the statistical fit is somewhat better for Model IV, there is
not sufficient evidence to prefer it at the expense of Model III. The point estimate
of fixed costs per boat in Model III of NOK 193,000 is not unreasonable compared
to the figures in Table 2. Also, Model IV indicates that an increase in the real
price of mackerel, presumably causing an increase in the opportunity cost of
herring fishermen, wil! lead to a decrease in participation in the herring fishery.
Wilen (1976) estimated a similar capital entry-exit equation for the North Pa-
eific fur seal fishery. For the period with open access exploitation (1886-1900),
a point estimate of n of 0.02 was obtained. This indicates considerably slower
capital adjustment than in the herring fishery, presumably due to fewer alternative
employment opportunities for sealers than for herring fishermen. The cutoff return
per vessel was estimated to be $4,800.00.
As noted above, there could be reason to expect a more rapid response in
terms of entry due to positive profits than exit due to negative profits. To test for
such an asymetric response, we shall follow a procedure suggested by Wolfram
(1971). We specify the following asymetric response function:
where
t=i \ "-I r^t-\
K,_,
and otherwise zero,
rf _ , :«• nt/pt /n,-i/pt-i\
».t - I in —^ < I —~ I and otherwise zero.
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According to this model specification, there will be further entry to (exit from)
the fishery only insofar as current period profits per boat exceed (are less than)
the previous period's profits, n^ and n" measure change in fleet participation in
response to rising and falling profits respectively.
Estimating the model* gave the following results:
Parameter Point Estimate t-statistic
n^ 0.0940 2.86
n" 0.0855 3.30
Although the point estimate of n "^ is slightly higher than that of n ^, the difference
is statistically insignificant. Accordingly, the empirical results do not support the
hypothesis that entry in response to positive profits is more elastic than exit due
to negative profits.
The boats in question are purse seiners that may participate in up to seven
seasonal fisheries. If profits per boat are high in the North Sea herring fishery,
entry will be rapid. Similarly, as the boats have alternative fishing opportunities,
exit will be rapid in response to falling profits. Accordingly, the result that the
rate of exit is not statistically different from the rate of entry is an indication of
the availability of alternative fisheries.
So far, it is assumed that adjustments in capital depend on current period
profits per unit of capital and possibly the return in the alternative fishery. In any
one year, there exists a fleet of a given number of boats. However, new boats
may also be built in response to the existence of positive profits in excess of the
alternative return on capital. Since it takes time to construct new boats, this is
an argument for including lagged values of average profits per boat as explanatory
variables. The length of the time lag to be specified should correspond to the
construction time for new boats. We have specified the following lagged versions
of the estimating equations:
f, = fVt (Lll)
K... -K, = n(^l +n, i^r^l +n,(^^| + n, l'^") (LIV)
Here, an adjustment lag of a maximum of two periods (years) has been specified,
which appears quite reasonable compared to the time required for constructing
and building new purse seiners. Parameters ni and n2 are both expected to be
positive. The lagged version of Model II has been excluded from further analysis,
since the three other models performed better than this model. The results are
given in Tables 4, 5, and 6.
* OLS estimation. H = 0.53, r^ = 0.49, and DW = 1.82. Fixed and opportunity costs as
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From the results in Tables 4-6, the following conclusions can be drawn:
1) The inclusion of lagged variables is seen to improve the explanatory power
of Models III and IV, measured in terms of both adjusted r^ and t-statistics, while
there is less improvement for Model 1. This indicates that the evidence with re-
spect to lagged adjustment to changes in profitability conditions is inconclusive.
2) All point estimates of ni are ofthe wrong sign and insignificant. Excluding
the variable profits per boat lagged once causes only insignificant changes in other
parameter estimates and a slight improvement in adjusted r-, which suggests the
variable is redundant. Point estimates of n2 are highly significant in Model III and
in one case significant at the 90% level in Model IV. Accordingly, while a one
year lag is c!early rejected, there is some evidence which suggests that if a time
lag is to be considered, a two year lag should be specified. This corresponds to
the time required for constructing and building new boats.
3) Point estimates of n are in general remarkably stable and not significantly
ditTerent from 0.1, compare also the results of Table 3. The same is true for the
combined effects of the variables profits per boat (n -I- ni + n^). The exception
is Model III with profits per boat lagged twice, where the combined effect is
higher than in the other regression results.
4) The three models represent alternative hypotheses about the opportunity
cost of capital, but the empirical results do not clearly validate any one hypothesis
at the expense of the others. However, the empirical results indicate that the
alternative cost of capital is affected by the profitability in the mackerel fishery,
as represented by the relative price of mackerel.
5) The point estimates ofthe cutoff rate of return vary between NOK 317,000
and NOK 355,000 (Model III). Compared to the figures in Table 2, these are not
unreasonable.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The present analysis started out with the hypothesis that fieet adjustment is pro-
portional to profits in the fishery. However, it was acknowledged that a discrete
time model might be more appropriate than continuous time models, in response
to the fact that once boats are committed to one fishery, they are reluctant to
regear for another fishery.
This basic adjustment hypothesis was to a large extent supported by the em-
pirical results from estimating capital dynamics for the North Sea herring fishery.
Various alternatives for the opportunity cost of capital were specified. In one
model, it was related to the returns in the mackerel fishery, which might be con-
sidered an alternative to fishing herring. More elaborate models, which introduced
lagged variables to refiect adjustment time to changes in profitability conditions
such as the time required to build new boats, showed some improvements in the
statistical fit.
The empirical analysis ofthe herring fishery was made difficult by a somewhat
short time series, a condition that is likely to exist in several fisheries. The spec-
ification of alternative models did not cause a marked improvement in the em-
pirical results. These indicate that fleet adjustment primarily depends on current
period profits and that the opportunity cost may depend on returns in the alter-74 Trond Bj0rndal and Jon M. Conrad
native fishery. The results are likely to be of relevance for estimating capital
dynamics in other fisheries.
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